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Pedagogy of the Written Image 
Jonathan Lahey Dronsfield 
University of Reading 
Readings are just fantastic! When you get right down to it, 
the most fantastic thing you could film is people reading. I 
don't see why no one's done it. Film someone who's 
simply reading... 
- Jean Luc-Godard1 
 
1. 
Text, it is Jean-Luc Godard’s “ennemi royal, principal”.2 Text, it is on the 
side of death, “les images c’est la vie et les textes, c’est la mort”.3 Twenty 
years later and the war is not over: “Une image est paisible. Une image de la 
Vierge avec son petit enfant sur son âne n'amène pas la guerre, c'est son 
interprétation par un texte qui amènera la guerre et qui fera que les soldats 
de Luther iront déchirer les toiles de Raphaël.”4 Godard’s story is not just of 
the history of cinema, it is one in which text has won out to the extent that 
TV and the computer too make of the image something subservient to text. 
“Since Gutenberg” the text has triumphed in this way. “There was a long 
struggle, marriage or liaison between painting and text. Then the text carried 
the day. Film is the last art in the pictorial tradition... Take away the text and 
you’ll see what’s left. In TV nothing is left.”5 It is obvious from these lines of 
demarcation, lines which divide the art of the image from what would 
declare war on its most sacred icons and defeat its technologies, a conflict in 
which there is just the one aggressor, a division which makes of the relation 
between image and text nothing less than a matter of life and death, that for 
Godard text is indeed the enemy. 
Except that the matter is not as simple as this pitch would pretend. Not 
just because for a cinéaste with a love for the cinema writing can be a way of 
making films, “To us, writing about films or going to the cinema was the 
same as making movies”. Not just because text in the hands of the right critic 
is a declaration of love for the cinema, “To love someone blindly is to love 
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someone unquestioningly. We in the nouvelle vague loved the cinema before 
we had actually seen it.”6 Not just because it is only when words are taken 
as orders, unthinkingly, like a knife used malevolently, only then is text life-
threatening.7 And not just because the history of cinema cannot be told 
without text, the history of cinema being a history of its defeat by text or its 
resistance to it.  Rather, it is because in order to do film it is impossible to be 
against death, in order to do film it is necessary to risk death; or in other 
words, to make a film it is necessary to make of death a formidable power of 
life, and that means making text the life of a film.8 Godard’s Histoire(s) du 
cinéma is a culminative work in this respect. More than just a meditation on 
the struggle between life and death, it is a work which makes of text a power 
of life by being as much a book as it is a film. Not just in its format (book and 
videocassette) or in how the film is structured (chapters), but more 
importantly still in how ‘the book’ is itself a persona in the film. But it is a 
persona without any interiority, it is a persona at the level of ‘it speaks’. 
Books feature throughout the film’s chapters, they speak, there is the sound 
of them being written. Both the film and the book Histoire(s) du cinéma are 
expressions of the “fraternité ou de l'égalité” of image to text, and Godard 
admits that the book is perhaps more successful in this respect than the 
film.9 Histoire(s) is, then, as much an attempt to re-write the history of 
cinema as it is to retrieve it from the dictatorship of the script.  
In Film Socialisme, Godard’s most recent film (2010), no less than thirty 
four authors are credited as textual source. There is a scene in the film where 
Alain Badiou lectures on Husserl to an empty lecture theatre on board a 
cruise ship. Godard did not construct this scene, in the sense that he did not 
arrange to have no-one turn up. But the scene could not have served better 
to show what it is to read from a text. Godard wanted to quote from 
Husserl’s Origin of Geometry and he invited Badiou to develop something of 
his own from that quotation (Badiou is not one of the authors credited as 
textual source), but no-one turned up to listen. To quote from a text is to 
speak it not to someone other but to oneself, and in doing so to hear oneself 
as someone other. Badiou remarked on entering the empty auditorium 
“Enfin, je peux parler devant personne.”10 But what he might have said is 
that finally he gets to speak in front of the book. Books have a constitutive 
role in Godard’s film practice, they have always appeared in his films. And 
those books are often voiced over by a reflection on what it is to read, where 
the questions posed about reading are themselves quotations from books, 
and in particular the writings of philosophers, for instance Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein.11 But Godard professes not to know how to read such books, 
“Lire des livres «techniques» de philosophie,” he says, “j'en suis 
incapable”.12 He has been saying so from the start, see his remarks on 
Foucault (the “Reverend Doctor Foucault”) in the interview from which 
comes our epigram.13 Mindful of Robert Bresson’s dictum, that “Ideas 
gathered from reading will always be bookish ideas”, Godard approaches 
the book as if it were a persona, a persona lacking interiority but not a 
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certain legibility, the impersonal ‘it speaks’. 14 Rather than read the book, he 
maintains that he hears what he sees there: “Mais lorsque vous, ou bien 
d'autres, citez un auteur ou parlez d'un livre vous l'avez vraiment lu, de ma 
part j'entends un son, je pense qu'il doit aller là, il y a un mélange.”15 And by 
mélange he means the way images of text and sounds of text are placed with 
images in which they would not ordinarily be found: “Ça ne me gêne pas 
d’utiliser une phrase de Heidegger, alors que normalement on ne le mettrait 
pas dans un roman policier”.16 Thus if Godard quotes from a text by 
Heidegger it is not because he knows how to read a text by Heidegger, for 
he is “incapable of reading Heidegger”, it is because the text by Heidegger, 
the word of Heidegger spoken in the image with which it is mixed, plays a 
part in making visible what can be seen by making itself seen.17 
If Godard quotes a text by Heidegger it is because the text is necessary 
for the seen to become visible. He reads aloud from books in order that what 
the film shows become visible. This is the sense in which a phrase from 
Heidegger is needed, “Pas pour voir, mais pour faire voir”. It is as if the seen 
is not able to communicate what it is without being made visible by words. 
“Pour faire voir ce qu’on a vu. If faut des mots pour transmettre.”18 In order 
that what there is become visible, text is necessary. It is not that text is 
subsidiary; on the contrary, there would be no need to resist it were that the 
case. It is that there is no visibility without text. This is the ground of 
Godard’s resistance to it, because it invites the thought that image is 
invisible without text, or at least dependent on text for its visibility. But we 
must be careful not to make of dependency a one-way relation, or the power 
of text something opposed to that of the image. If we maintain that the 
image would not be visible without text, we insist at the same time that 
there is no text legible without the image. To suppose that text can put 
image to the death arises from the mistaken presupposition that one can be 
purified of the other. Godard fights the power of text, and testifies to that 
power in doing so. But what he also does is reveal the necessary complicity 
between text and image, he negates the hierarchy between them, he 
demonstrates their co-dependency their co-originality, he shows that you 
cannot have one without the other. If Godard does not reject death it is 
because he sees it as repetition, he sees it not as end but as and; text as the 
death to be risked is the possibility of resistance. Text is what Godard resists 
and that to which he turns in resisting it.   
2. 
What is philosophically important about text in Godard’s films is the 
way in which he elevates it to the status of image. We shall name such an 
image the written image. It is an image which takes not just the form of the 
book appearing in the frame but the inscription of text within and across the 
frame – images of text handwritten, typewritten, electronically generated, 
found, thrown. We will argue that it is with the written image that Godard 
confers a new visibility on film, and that such visibility is as much a matter 
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of the legibility of the image as it is of what is to be seen. It is this legibility 
that Gilles Deleuze calls Godard’s pedagogy of the image. Deleuze takes his 
lead from Godard’s militant conception of the pedagogical function of the 
film frame: “l’écran est simplement un tableau noir ou un mur d’école qui 
offre l’analyse concrète d’une situation concrète”,19 to make a ‘concrete 
analysis’ of a ‘concrete situation’ being the thirteenth edict of ‘What is to be 
done’,20 the ‘Maoist’ manifesto accompanying the 1970 film British Sounds. 
Deleuze draws on this sloganising of the frame when stating in the first few 
pages of Cinéma I that “le cadre nous apprendre ainsi que l’image ne se 
donne pas seulement à voir. Elle est lisible autant que visible.”21 If the image 
in Godard can function to record sound and image information in such a 
way as to make it legible as well as visible it is because for Deleuze the 
Godardian frame is essentially empty, an opaque surface, white or black, 
what elsewhere he calls a ‘plan fixe’.22 Or in other words, the screen is a 
blackboard. There are numerous examples of the blackboard featuring as the 
frame for the inscription of text in Godard’s films, especially those from the 
first half of his career leading up to the beginning of the making of Histoire(s) 
du cinéma in 1988, from the would-be revolutionaries of La Chinoise learning 
how to speak the text of Mao’s Little Red Book, through the ‘Leçons de 
choses’ of Six fois deux, to the biblical opacity of Sauve qui peut (la vie). But 
Deleuze’s point is that the screen as such is for Godard a blackboard. It is not 
that Godard’s films show the blackboard as they would an object, it is that 
the film screen is a blackboard, in the sense that it is a surface on which 
everything can be shown equally. Serge Daney, one of Deleuze’s 
interlocutors on cinema, argues that Godard’s screen is an empty blackboard 
because the sine qua non of Godardian pedagogy is to take the text at its 
word, the statement as already given, in order then to oppose another word, 
another statement.23 Thus the screen must be empty in order that it become 
the site of a struggle, the place where opposing discourses can co-exist in 
such a way that Godard’s stance toward the good discourse, for instance 
Maoist doctrine, be undecidable, what Daney calls “the great unknown” in 
Godard’s pedagogy. But we must pause in the face of the claim that 
Godard’s method is one of setting up oppositions or of opposing one thing 
to another, precisely because of the relation between disjoining and joining 
and the play between image and text exemplified by the written image in his 
films.  
Deleuze is in agreement with Daney, the screen is essentially empty, it 
is a fixed background, and this is what is so new about Godard. But it is 
what Godard’s pedagogy aims for according to Deleuze that is of interest: 
belief in the world, belief not in another world or a transformed world or an 
idealised world but belief in this world. But by ‘this world’ Deleuze means a 
world “en deça ou au-delà des mots”.24 As if Godard wishes to restore belief 
in a world “before or beyond words”, as if a world “before or beyond 
words” is truly the one in which we live – if only we could see it, where 
seeing would be believing. Then this world is not of its time, because its 
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ways of seeing are not present unto itself, this world’s time is not its own. 
What is it that leads Deleuze to dream of such a world, a world ‘before and 
beyond words’, a world which is no more possible, or no more a world, than 
an empty film frame? He is determined to enlist Godard in the aesthetic 
project he inherits from Artaud, to separate word from image, a project to 
return and restore the word to its proper place, the body. It is the other side 
of the call in Différence et répétition to rid thinking of the image in the name of 
Artaud’s ‘terrible revelation’ of an “image without thought”,25 something 
Deleuze finally gives up on to the extent that in the late Qu'est-ce que la 
philosophie? great philosophers are measured by their ability to produce new 
images of thought.26 If the screen is opaque it is not because it is empty, it is 
not because it presents a neutral ground on which to stage an opposition in 
which Godard does not take sides yet from which emerges the possibility of 
a world ‘free from words’, a world restored to its original unity ‘before the 
word’, it is because an opaque screen arrests the image, stops it in order for 
it to be looked at again or seen for the first time, and it is seen again as if for 
the first time not because it has been resurrected from subservience to text, 
but because it is brought face-to-face with text, it is given to be encountered 
by text, both text from without and text within the image, the image is 
stopped in order that its text be seen, that it be brought to encounter its own 
text, and that its text be made legible.  
It is a defining characteristic of modern cinema, for Deleuze, that the 
image is more ‘legible’ [‘lisible’] than visible. It is this that makes possible 
“toute une pédagogie de l’image”. The legibility is primarily given by new 
relations between the aural and the optical, sound and image, in which word 
plays a subsidiary role.27 In this ‘pedagogy of perception’ (Deleuze borrows 
the term from Daney) it is the dissymmetry and disjunction between the 
aural and visual “qui allaient donner à l’oeil un pouvoir de lire l’image”.28 
But the opposition between the aural and the visual, the ear and the eye, 
locates word on one side, that of sound, at the expense of word as image. In 
the last section of the final chapter of the second cinema volume, L’image 
temps, Deleuze develops most fully his understanding of pedagogy in 
modern cinema, with Godard its most important exponent.29 Deleuze argues 
that since Eisenstein cinema has sought to make the image readable and not 
just visible, to make an image such that when it is seen it is read, and that 
this culminates in Godard’s image “lisible pour son compte”.30 The image 
has become legible for itself through the irrational cut having superseded 
the rational cut. The irrational cut separates sound from image, purifies the 
image of any speech to which it would rationally be joined, allowing both 
visual image and sound image to attain their ‘own’ limit. It is a separateness 
common to both, yet the only way this commonality can be acknowledged is 
through the irrational cut.31 The irrational cut thus has a double effect, it 
separates speech from what is seen, and at the same time it joins speech in 
its separateness, or what Deleuze prefers to call its purity, to that which it is 
separate from. The more this double operation is carried out on the visual 
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image, the more readable it becomes. Deleuze calls the resulting images, 
images to be read as much as to be seen, ‘lectosigns’ – a lectosign is the site 
of a junction, the junction between disjunction and conjunction.32 In English 
there is not lecto but lector, reader, from legere, to read. It has two senses: 
ecclesiastic, one whose duty it is to read the lesson; and academic, a reader 
or lecturer in a university. Or in other words, following the irreducible sense 
attaching to this word we arrive at a teaching delivered through reading. A 
lectosign then would be a sign which lectures through the reading of it. A 
sign which when it is seen reads to the viewer, a sign which is not so much 
read when seen as seen reading to the viewer. 
Images in which what is said bears no rational relation to what is seen 
are images which have been purified of rational correspondence. Such 
images are autonomous, cut off from the world, non-totalisable.33 Images 
which have been disjoined in this way, and in their disjointedness conjoined, 
are masters over their own framing, they are images which no longer have 
an outside, they are images “comme un pouvoir de se retourner sur elles-
mêmes”.34 No longer governed by text, no longer ordered by the already 
written scripts of the discourses of literature or politics or privilege, they are 
images of things ‘before the word’ ascribed by pre-existing discourses. And 
yet they are all the more readable for that. What Deleuze means by reading 
is a retournement of the image, an act where the empty screen is converted 
into a full one.35 The question is whether Deleuze sees the reversal of the 
image as itself reversible, that is whether it can go both ways, where what is 
said can bring into question what is seen, and where what is seen can bring 
into question what is said, or whether the reversal is one way, what is said 
bringing into question what is seen. Or in other words, to what extent is 
Godard’s visible world ‘beyond or before words’ a reversible play between 
what is seen and said, or simply a one-way reversal where because what is 
seen is what cannot be heard, the image becomes raised to the power of the 
unspeakable. If the reversal is indeed reversible, it will lead to the reversal of 
the rational towards the irrational, and the irrational back towards the 
rational. Not back to a rational left unchanged as a result of the reversal, but 
a rational at play with what it is opposed to rather than at war with it, and 
where play is not reduced to a benign non-oppositionality but elevated to a 
questioning of where and when the distinction between the two falls, a 
questioning where the answer cannot be governed by the rational without 
reinforcing the very distinction being put into question, therefore negating 
the questioning force of the play. Such a reversibility would not leave film 
under the condition of the irrational as if the irrational were opposed to the 
rational, it would instead elevate it to the status of a thinking adequate to the 
play between the rational and the irrational. We will see shortly that this 
cannot be a dialectical process. 
So long as the relation between sound and image is governed by the 
rational, the potentiality of images will always be negated in favour of 
J o n a t h a n  L a h e y  D r o n s f i e l d  |  9 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 2 (2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.214 
establishing and fixing a one-way dependency, where either what is seen 
determines what is sayable, or what is said determines what is visible; and 
in order to avoid this Deleuze divides the image into a visual purified of the 
word and an audible purified of the seen, the first stage of a two-stage 
process before the two are re-linked irrationally. But is not this first stage 
distillation itself a rational operation? How else to separate the said in the 
seen and the seen in the said, other than by a rationality of identification and 
purification? Deleuze speaks of the way the films of Marguerite Duras or 
Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet purify the speech act of the authority 
of the text.36 But at the same time they reveal a certain resistance of the text 
to itself. Godard does the same thing by showing words on the screen. By 
repeating as an image a word spoken Godard displaces text from the 
constativity of the speech act. In making text visible he displaces the word 
from the intentionality of the speech act, revealing a materiality in excess of 
and resistant to its subjection or reduction to intentional relations between 
characters in a dialogue or between character and the referents of their 
utterances. By reading words and sentences from the page he frees text up 
from the fixity of the book and its subjugation by argument or by narrative 
logic. In both cases a resistance internal to the text itself is performed. But it 
is not a final word, it is a temporal displacement, one which gives the viewer 
time to think.  
There is in Godard, for Deleuze, a “primat trés spécial” of the word over 
the image, in that the word can act as a category which orders the image and 
through which images must pass.37 Categories are not derived from each 
other, they are connected by ‘and’, where ‘and’ can stand for any and every 
relation. As a category the written word acts as the passage between series, 
and can induce mutations between them. Categories problematise the 
image, and thereby “introduisent la réflexion dans l’image même.” It is this 
reflection which we are calling the general readability of the image in 
Godard. To distinguish between the written word as a category and the 
visual image as the series ordered by the category ought not to lead to the 
implication that the written word is not an important visual image in 
Godard. Indeed, and unlike the other examples Deleuze gives of the 
categories in Godard comprising his ‘table of categories’, for instance things, 
acts, and people, we are arguing here that the written word has been no 
more fully and comprehensively introduced into cinema than by Godard, to 
the extent that we might say that it is his invention, that it is his Godard’s 
category. The written word is the privileged visual image in Godard, in that 
its privilege is double, first in the sense that as an image the written word 
can act as a category through which other images must pass; and second 
because the image of the written word is Godard’s specific contribution to 
the categorial images structuring the history of cinema.  
Deleuze avers that it would be wrong to think that modern cinema is 
similar to silent cinema in its re-introduction of text in the form of intertitles 
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and other scriptural elements. In silent cinema intertitles were there to be 
read, whereas images in which other scriptural elements are present were 
there to be seen in the same way other non-scriptural types of images were 
there to be seen. Today, however, “c’est l’image visuelle qui doit être lue 
tout entière”, and images of intertitles are but one layer of scripturality, or 
the passage from one layer to another.38 There is no longer one element 
which makes the image readable today; rather the image is readable as such, 
all of it, and that is because the speech act has become autonomous from the 
image. Intertitles and other images of text are but the pointillées, as Deleuze 
puts it, the dots, of a generalised readability. This readability is 
‘stratigraphic’, or archaeological, where the dots are evidence of something 
deeper. Deleuze characterises the stratigraphic image in exactly the same 
way he does the lectosign, “lue en même temps que vue”.39 The choice of 
stratigraphy to name the kind of writing that makes the image in general 
readable is significant. It implies layers spread out or thrown down, a 
coating where the graphy is tectonic or of strata. According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, stratigraphy is almost the only example of this rare 
hybrid between descriptive science and style or process of writing that has 
obtained general currency. With it Deleuze names what he calls “une 
nouvelle Analytique de l’image”.40 Godard’s great pedagogical contribution 
to this new analytic of the image is to have shown how the screen, the 
pictorial surface, is constituted by the word, is textualised from the start, 
how the underside of film is coated with text. There is always word and 
image emerging into what is seen, and always word and image coming 
down from over what is heard. Godard’s images are stagings of the play 
between the text under and the text above the seen and the heard, between 
what in the seen is seen and heard from below and above, and what in the 
heard is seen and heard from above and below.  
Contra Deleuze, there is no purification involved, because there never 
was a pure visual image or a pure speech act. If in silent cinema the intertitle 
was used to reinforce the naturalness of what was shown or the causal sense 
of the actions represented, then it was not simply the imposition of text on a 
naturally pre-given, pre-verbal image, it was as well the acknowledgement 
that the natural and the represented are already verbalised, already given by 
the word. In its use of the intertitle to join the image to a certain naturalness 
and to fix it in a given order of causal relations, silent cinema revealed the 
power of the word to disjoin the image from its condition of naturalness and 
to interfere with the causal relations between given actions. Throughout 
Godard’s work and his numerous interviews there is an appeal to the ‘before 
the name’, to a showing of things that would present the object before the 
name that would fix it in the order of language, before the name comes to 
stand for the thing itself, before the name acts as if it has let the thing come 
into being, and at that moment negating the thing.41 It might seem from such 
utterances and his appeal to a showing of things ‘before the name’ that 
Godard simply laments the introduction of text. To the contrary his films 
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reveal the extent to which the relation is reversible, and how text too can 
return words and things to states before the name, and can disorder 
relations between words and things such that the naming authority of the 
image is brought into question no less than that of the name, where the 
word is no longer ordered by the power that images have to naturalise, no 
longer governed by a taxonomical privilege given by the authority of 
illustration, no longer subject to the weight of revelation disbursed by the 
true icon. In short, image and text are held apart in Godard’s films, at just 
that moment before text disappears into the image, before it disappears into 
what makes it visible as Giorgio Agamben puts it.42 The written image is the 
making explicit of this moment, of ‘the power of stoppage’ that is cinema’s 
gift. 
We see it especially in the TV series Six fois deux, in which Godard and 
Anne-Marie Miéville construct a series of daily lessons, the primary teaching 
of which is Seeing is not what you think it is. Each of the six episodes of Six 
fois deux is divided in two, and the division is essentially along the lines of 
image and text. The first part is the lesson of things, images of objects, the 
second a language lesson, text as object: two parts of the same lesson. Both 
teach the same lesson, and that lesson is that if you are going to see there 
cannot be one without the other, but that the two must be held apart in 
order to see their unity. It is not possible to see things, to see things anew 
and as if for the first time, without the word given by text. As the second 
episode ‘Leçons de choses’ puts it, what can be seen appears in the interval 
between where text and image, image and text, become the here and the 
elsewhere. And it is that interval which is legible, it is a legibility which 
holds text and image apart, and at the same time it is the space in or the 
surface on which can stand the viewer, the viewer in turn becoming the 
point where the two, image and text, become indiscernible.   The play of the 
separateness and non-separateness of image and text is staged on the surface 
film, on Godard’s opaque screen, where the written image stands as the 
making explicit of this moment, but that play cannot be understood or 
sensed without the two, image and text, becoming indiscernible on the body 
of the viewer.  
We can understand why, then, Jacques Fieschi speaks of a “certain 
pedagogical frustration” to be heard in the ‘white voice’ of Godard’s 
narration appearing to create its citations rather than borrow them.43 This 
‘pedagogical frustration’ is part of the film being stopped, its pause, it is the 
moment of study. It is the lesson of APPRENDRE A VOIR PAS A LIRE (Ici et 
ailleurs). It is akin to how Agamben characterises the experience of he who 
studies, in that  to study is to be stopped and stunned. The st- root of studium 
is the shock of impact: ‘those who study are in the situation of people who 
have received a shock and are stupefied by what has struck them’.44 This is 
not the stammer or the stutter learnt off by heart by the disciple, the 
‘Deleuzian’, it is dumb pause before the beginning again, the relearning how 
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to speak, it is Godard rubbing things together such that their finality is worn 
through to expose the need to look again, read again. 
3. 
Jacques Rancière too accepts the basic premise that Godard’s films are 
about learning to see and to read; not just about learning to read phrases but 
“lire avec elles”.45 For instance La Chinoise is about learning to ‘read with’ the 
phrases from Mao’s Little Red Book. Rancière sees this learning to ‘read with’ 
as an Althusserian dialectic of the ‘deux en un’, such that “quand le mot 
«fait voir», il ne se laisse plus entendre. Et quand l’image fait entendre, elle 
ne se laisse plus voir”.46 Rancière is at one with Godard’s own 
understanding of his films when he says of the crossover of word and image 
“Les mots font image. Ils font voir.” What Godard wants, according to 
Rancière, is to “interrompre le défilement, la substitution incessante des 
mots qui font voir et des images qui parlent, imposant la croyance”, to 
disassociate word from image, to break apart the unity of an image in which 
words play a determinate role in what we see, and images do likewise for 
what we hear.47 To disassociate word from image is to make of the relation 
between the two a lesson. If Godard actually shows a lesson, together with 
all its apparatuses including the blackboard, then he does so not just to 
challenge the authority of ‘big words’ and the regimes of discourses already 
said, already written, but to pose the question whether the attainment of 
authenticity in the use of words isn’t in fact just like being before the 
blackboard, for the word must be made visible in order for the viewer to see 
what it is saying.48 About La Chinoise it appears that Rancière is in agreement 
with Deleuze and Daney, that Godard does not take sides and refuses to 
make a decision for one discourse over another, simply setting discourses in 
tension with each other through their visualisation.49 But elsewhere Rancière 
seems to contradict this, when for instance he argues that Godard’s 
unbinding of images in Histoire(s) du cinéma, rather than giving them 
independence “overbinds them in another ideological plot”.50 If the seeming 
contradiction can be accounted for it will be because Godard’s practice of 
separating and rejoining image from text, image to text denies us the 
authority by which we might decide whether he does choose or does not, 
because his films will include instances of choice or non-choice and then 
these instances reconfigured once more through their text being repeated 
and displaced in the reading if it. 
Rancière is also no different from Deleuze in saying that another way 
Godard achieves disassociation which would lead us to ‘believe’ is to return 
the word to the body. Returning the word to the body is to make of the word 
a gesture. To play out the word as a gesture on the body is another way of 
making the word visible, allowing it in turn to be heard for what it is. 
Indeed, in having the word played out as a gesture is to allow discourses of 
one sort to look like discourses of another, for instance the words and 
gestures of political discourse can be made to look like the utterances and 
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attitudes of a love affair. But Rancière critiques Godard’s practice of 
disassociation for how it leads to an infinitisation of the possible ways in 
which the disassociated image can be re-linked with other images, in 
particular in Histoire(s) du cinéma. In his project of wresting the cinematic 
image from its subservience to the script, Godard has a tendency to make of 
the filmic image an icon, by separating it from the narrative arrangement 
from which it gained its original sense. For Rancière we do not remember an 
image in a Hitchcock film for example, say the glass of milk in Suspicion, 
because of its pictorial value but because of how it plays a part in the 
narrative of the film and how its value as an image is given it precisely by 
the narrative in which it is fixed and by which it is ordered. Thus the 
criticism is that Godard ‘dissociates the indissociable’.51 But to dissociate the 
indissociable is what Rancière himself does when he separates what is 
‘pictorial’ in the image in Hitchcock from its place in the narrative. One way 
of enhancing narrative is to draw out the image pictorially, to separate it 
from its straightforward narrative placement, by the cinematic means of 
framing and rhythm for instance, which momentarily arrests the narrative 
logic only then to impress it on the surface of the screen more deeply and to 
propel the narrative more urgently. This is precisely what Hitchcock does. 
For Godard to borrow an image worked by Hitchcock in this way is not 
simply for Godard to draw an element out of narrative and separate it 
pictorially, it is to see firstly that Hitchcock himself does this in order to 
enhance the narrative; and second it is to realise that the creation of such 
images in Hitchcock is itself the work of montage, montage being the art of 
stopping the film, to give us time to think about it. For Godard to take an 
image from Hitchcock is to have seen the image not just in terms of its 
content, but as a form under the condition of montage, where its developed 
pictorial nature is not at odds with the narrative arrangement it is drawn 
from, but on the contrary is what allows it to link ever more strongly with 
other elements in the narrative. The condition of montage is not something 
that happens to an image from without, it is the image having been 
separated from itself through cinematic means.  
But for Rancière if Godard disjoins an image from itself, or as he puts it 
transforms the image as image through a process of soustraction from the 
film’s continuum, it is not to create a disjunction in which to intervene. 
Indeed, he argues that Godard’s work has undergone an about-turn since 
the militant films of the 1960s/70s. Where once Godard may have 
fragmented an image or a narrative in the service of revealing hitherto 
unseen, suppressed or unacknowledged interests, of learning how to see, 
how to read with, where a narrative of revolution can be made to sound like 
that of a love affair, in the later work, particularly in Histoire(s) du cinéma, the 
same process is used to release images for their part in a film “whose 
aesthetic name is mystery and whose political name is History“,52 the 
mystery of co-belonging, the history a ‘reserve historicity’ of infinite 
connection.53 The process is the same in both cases, but it is what the images 
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are freed for and re-linked for that has changed. Where before Godard could 
be said to be unbinding and re-binding images in the name of dialectic, now 
he does so in the name of symbolism.54 In both cases it involves doing two 
things, displacing the image from text, from its subservience to the script, 
and creating a space in which all elements can be shown to belong equally.55 
This space in which the image is no longer coupled to the text and in which 
all elements belong equally Rancière names a ‘sensorium originaire’. It 
implies a co-presence not just of elements but of the discourses and images 
which shape them and give them sense, in which text has no more or less 
authority than image. It is a realm in which “toute chose parle deux fois”, in 
its presence as the thing in itself, ‘before the name’ in Godard’s sense, 
unencumbered by the ascription of word by dominant pre-existing 
discourses, and in its possible connections with every other element, where 
what something speaks is given it by its being mixed and associated with 
those other elements co-present.56  
Rancière characterises this as a dialectic, between non-manipulation and 
manipulation, between non-manipulated unmediated pure presence and 
manipulated meaning through association given by montage.57 It is nothing 
less than the tension at the heart of Romanticism, the sheer sensibility of the 
non-manipulable versus the absolute freedom of creation.58 Godard’s 
method and his own expressed intentions may appear to favour the first of 
these two processes, but Rancière argues that he is obliged to utilise the 
second method to enhance the first, for pure presence can only be achieved 
through manipulation. Images are elevated to their ownmost presence by 
the same gesture that renders them polyvalent.59 Purity is made possible by 
the very power which allows an image to be linked to another, the power of 
montage. But montage is not possible without the co-presence of the word in 
the same frame as the image. Thus there is no such thing as an image of pure 
presence disassociated from the text of signification or discourse. Godard’s 
method is not dialectical; or rather if it is dialectical then it is also not, and 
more fundamentally not, and it is the written image which makes this 
explicit. We are arguing that the written image is outside the opposition 
between image and text. If this is so then it is that which a dialectic would 
necessarily have to dialecticise. If Rancière were right and Godard’s is a 
dialectic then Godard would be showing the written image in order to 
dialecticise it. But what is being shown here is that the written image is a 
supplement to the dialectic in the sense given this term by Jacques Derrida, 
the supplement to the dialectic is that which does not allow itself to be 
dialecticised.60 In doing so it reveals a non-oppositional difference, a 
difference that does not oppose the image-text opposition yet nonetheless 
stands outside it. But in making the dialectic impossible such an image 
would re-launch the dialectic. The written image, being outside the image-
text opposition, is precisely that which a dialectics of image and text would 
necessarily have to dialecticise if the method is one of dialectics. Thus we 
can say that Godard’s method is outside dialectics but not  opposed to it. It is 
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in Derrida’s terms an attempt at a dialecticity which is not dialectical. The 
written image in Godard resists the dialectical without opposing it. For this 
reason we cannot say that Godard’s method is one of opposition. The 
written image is like a third term, as if it wanted to touch the edges of both 
image and text, to participate on one side and the other, but giving itself up 
to neither, arresting the image before what is seen disappears into discourse, 
or before what is said disappears into the image. But this does not make his 
method anti-dialectical, for that too would be dialectical in opposing it. 
Rather, it is neither dialectical nor non-dialectical, a non-dialectical 
dialectics, where text the greatest risk of death becomes the saving power of 
cinema, if that is it can be shown as image, written image.  
If text is as necessary for the rescue of an image from its subservience to 
script as it is for the script to exert its dominance over image, then there is no 
essential difference between modern cinema and representational cinema. 
And in this regard it is interesting to note that Rancière does specify a 
difference, not within cinema, but between cinema and what it therefore is 
not, between cinema and literature, and he locates it in the fact that cinema 
is essentially a matter of showing: “The difference is that cinema is deprived 
of the subtracting power of literature, namely, the ability not to show what it 
‘shows’. Cinema still shows what it shows. As a consequence, it must 
enforce its capacity to withdraw the obviousness of what it shows.”61 Here 
then we are returned to an essential difference between cinema and 
literature on the level of the image. If cinema cannot not show it is because it 
is first and foremost image. If literature can not show, if it can subtract, then 
it is because literature is text. Cinema can subtract an image from its order in 
a narrative and from its subservience to script, but it cannot subtract the 
image from its being an image, it cannot subtract from the image the 
showing of the image, all it can do is lessen the obviousness of what is 
shown by the image but which is nonetheless and always shown. But this is 
to reinstate the distinction between an image being essentially without text, 
and text being essentially without image. Rancière is mistaken to think that 
cinema does not have the power not to show. On the contrary, the power at 
its disposal can do more than lessen the obviousness of what it shows, it can 
withhold what it shows. It is a twofold power, it consists in the fact that 
cinema is both image and text, and in its being able to show text. Words 
have the power to make us see and not see, where what the image shows is 
itself a consequence of the way it is passed through text.  
Rancière affords little attention to the multiple images produced by 
Godard which are written images. His notion of the ‘phrase-image’, 
introduced in 2003, also does not take account of the written image as a 
separate image, or an image which might make more explicit the relation of 
what is anyway implicit in the relation of text to image in images.62 When he 
discusses the relation of image to text in La Chinoise for instance he does so 
referring to the word as it is discoursed by characters or played out as 
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gesture on their bodies, and not to the images of text inscribed in and across 
the frame. There is no explicit mention of the written image, no 
consideration given to the possibility that in being made into a written 
image the phrase is visibilised. At best the phrase “institue un quasi-visible 
qui ne vient jamais pourtant à la clarté de l’image.”63 But if on the other hand 
when we see a word we cannot hear it, what exactly is being shown? If the 
word shown in the image of a written word is made unreadable in its being 
shown, it is not simply the lessening of the word’s ‘obviousness’, it is the 
subtraction of what is shown.  If images are made to pass through written 
images made unreadable in the word being shown then what is subtracted 
from being shown is the power of other discursive formations and scripts 
already written that may otherwise govern what those images show, thereby 
are those images re-shown, not detached from the word but in new relations 
with it. Rancière’s cross-over [chassé-croisé] of image and text is overly 
determined by a conception of language as essentially the spoken word. To 
name it ‘cross-over’ may seek to reduce the oppositionality, but Rancière 
finds it difficult not to privilege the understanding over the sensible. His 
‘quasi-visible’, the image that never attains the clarity of an image, entailing 
and being entailed by the quasi-audible that an image is, is heard before it is 
seen, is audible before it is written. There may be two quasis, each entailing 
the other, and each “dure seulement le temps qu’il faut pour faire le travail 
de l’autre et enchaîner son pouvoir de disparition sur celui de l’autre”;64 but 
when we consider the written image we find that an image can become 
invisible or less visible not by becoming audible but by becoming visible, 
visible in the form of legible.  
Deleuze speaks of how perception is an act of subtraction; we never 
really see the fullness of images because our perception is overly determined 
by the images we have already seen. We see only what interests us in an 
image, and take away from it what is not of interest, where ‘interest’ is a 
function of other images we have already seen. Thus the more we see the 
less we perceive.65 But when an image is passed through text, what is of 
interest in the image is less determined by our experience of other images 
and more by how it gives itself to be read. Here ‘fullness’ is not the image’s 
ability to ‘store’ other images, and nor is it pace Deleuze a restored plenitude 
such that our perception ‘equals’ the image, as if the image is “giving up 
everything it has”. Rather, its fullness is its enhanced possibilities for 
reading and for linking to other images and other discourses which would 
otherwise be subtracted by other images. But resistance to the subtraction 
exerted by another image is itself subtraction, it is the power of language in 
the form of written image to take away from what is shown by the image ‘in 
itself’.  
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4. 
Not only do images have to pass through the word in Godard, but the 
word is made to pass through the image. If Godard cannot read Heidegger 
he is nonetheless offered paths by Heidegger’s texts that “pass through the 
image”, separating the image from itself, distancing the viewer from within 
the image, displacing the viewer without removing him. Only through this 
play of separation and non-separation does the image become visible.66 To 
read a text is to learn from it how to speak it – and speaking a text distances 
the reader from what the text says. In inscribing the word as a path written 
through the image Godard is saying that we do not simply know texts in 
understanding them or by reading them, but in fragmenting them, 
dispersing them into images, passing them though images, and undergoing 
them by way of the image, making them differently legible. If he puts into 
question what we think we know about a text, or what we presuppose about 
its relation to the image, he does so by confronting it not with an argument 
but with an image. If that form be the written image then the text is 
confronted with itself as an image. Likewise, in reading out loud he gives a 
text not as something to be understood in the form of an argument or a 
narrative, but as something to be heard and to be encountered as what can 
be heard in the word. The text is re-directed on to the image, the image is 
allowed to confront what can be heard. Making text something to be 
encountered rather than something ‘in the service of’ runs counter to 
Deleuze’s Artaud-critique of recognition and the uprightness of language. 
For text to be confronted it must be recognised, recognised in the sense of 
looked at in the face. So Godard needs to retain its literal uprightness, its 
stance, in order that its face be looked at and its uprightness in both a 
metaphorical and metaphysical sense confronted and challenged.  
Godard shows text not in order to reiterate its uprightness but to 
challenge it, to put into question its upright stance, or in other words its 
moral authority over the image, the order of dependency it exerts over the 
image – but he can only do this by confronting it. He seeks ways of giving 
the text as something to be encountered, sensed. And for these reasons its 
uprightness must be renewed, for only then will text be allowed to question 
its subservience to the image and be questioned about it. It is a making 
sensible something about the text that would be otherwise invisible or 
inaudible were it simply to be understood as subservient to what is said by 
the image. In Godard the word does not stand for the thing it names and 
does not stand in for it. Rather, Godard sensibilises the word of the thing, 
stands it up to be materially encountered. This is not to return the word to 
the body as Deleuze argues. It is to displace the body to a site where it can 
encounter the struggle between image and text. The body becomes the point 
of indiscernibility between image and text. It is the point at which the sense 
of reading is divided by the sensibility of what is written, where sense is 
divided by sense. This is to question the authority of the script, it is to put 
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into question the privilege of the understanding over sensibility. But it is not 
simply to invert the hierarchy, instating the one, sensibility (or in Deleuze’s 
terms the affect, the rational), over the other, understanding (the irrational).  
Godard repeats words. If a word is repeated it is not because it is 
uniform or to make it uniform. It is repeated in order to hear what is said in 
the word. It is repeated in order to make it possible again, to renew it in its 
possibility. This is not a question of polyvalence eliciting or revealing 
multiple meaning, but of what is brought to the word in saying it in the form 
of an image. When Godard utters and shows ‘et’ again and again in Ici et 
ailleurs it is not the same thing that is said each time, on the contrary ‘and’ is 
different each time, and the identicalness of sound and spelling cover over 
both what is the same in that word, namely its potential, and what is 
different in that word, a word which can stand for any and every relation. If 
the word were shown because of some presumed uniformity with how it is 
read then this showing would be nothing but representational. Godard’s 
written images are representational, but not just representational. They do 
not take as given in advance the equivalence of reading the word and 
showing the word; rather, their representationality consists in the fact that 
representation is as much a matter of text as it is visual. Godard’s is neither 
the purification of image and text (Deleuze) nor the dialectic between them 
(Rancière). He may seem to oppose the pictorial to the textual, but his sense 
of the pictorial is deepened when he introduces text into its frame, and the 
surface of the frame must already have depth in order that text be showable 
there. What Godard seeks is what all artists seek, the moment where the 
holding apart of image and text and their indiscernibility meet. It is the point 
when there can be no question that image is in text and text is in image, 
where our only responsibility is to inquire into what the relation between 
the two might be in this text or in that image.  
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